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Abstract
A growing body of literature reports evidence of social interaction
effects in survey expectations. In this note, we argue that evidence in
favor of social interaction effects should be treated with caution, or
could even be spurious. Utilizing a parsimonious stochastic model of
expectation formation and dynamics, we show that the existing sam-
ple sizes of survey expectations are about two orders of magnitude
too small to reasonably distinguish between noise and interaction ef-
fects. Moreover, we argue that the problem is compounded by the fact
that highly correlated responses among agents might not be caused
by interaction effects at all, but instead by model-consistent beliefs.
Ultimately, these results suggest that existing survey data cannot fa-
cilitate our understanding of the process of expectations formation.
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1 Introduction
Expectations play a central role in economic theory, yet we know rather lit-
tle about the actual process of expectation formation. A growing body of
literature emphasizes the importance of social interactions in the process of
expectation formation, and mostly finds empirical support for interaction ef-
fects in reported survey data. These survey expectations typically consist
of several hundred monthly responses by several hundred agents. Here we
consider a generic stochastic model of expectation dynamics that contains
both a social interaction component and an exogenous signal that represents
model-consistent beliefs. The purpose of this note is to show that it is es-
sentially not possible to disentangle the two effects in survey data, and that
even if social interactions were present, the required sample size to iden-
tify interaction effects is about two orders of magnitude larger than existing
sample sizes. Even if we are willing to make strong assumptions about the
structure of multidimensional responses, existing survey data will probably
remain a very fragile source for the identification of interaction effects or
model-consistent beliefs.
Modern macroeconomics assumes that agents know the ‘true’ model un-
derlying the macroeconomic laws of motion, and that their predictions of
the future are on average correct. In their extensive review, Pesaran and
Weale (2006) find little if any evidence that survey expectations are model-
consistent in this strong sense, which is hardly surprising given the complexity
of our macroscopic environment. Weaker forms of macroeconomic rationality
acknowledge that agents face model uncertainty and instead focus on learning
(see, e.g., Evans and Honkapohja, 2001; Milani, 2010), informational rigidi-
ties (see, e.g., Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Mankiw et al., 2004; Coibion and
Gorodnichenko, 2008), imperfect information (see, e.g., Woodford, 2001; Del
Negro and Eusepi, 2009), and ‘rational inattention’ (see, e.g., Sims, 2003).
While details of the forward-looking behavior of agents are crucial for the
qualitative differences among these approaches, neither of them considers
the actual process of expectations formation.
Recent econometric approaches are discussing the existence of heterogene-
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ity in the updating behavior of forecasters (see, e.g., Clements, 2010), and
laboratory experiments equally indicate heterogeneity in expectations (see,
e.g., Hommes, 2010). The focus on heterogeneity intersects with another
strand of research that emphasizes the importance of social interactions in
the process of expectations formation. Empirical work on social interactions
has traditionally employed discrete choice frameworks that allow for social
spillovers in agents’ utility (see, e.g., Brock and Durlauf, 2001), but this ap-
proach has been rather static in the sense that cross-sectional configurations
are viewed as self-consistent equilibria. The discrete choice framework has
also been investigated in the context of macroeconomic expectations forma-
tion, for instance by positing that agents choose between forming extrap-
olative expectations and (costly) rational expectations (see, e.g., Lines and
Westerhoff, 2010), which can lead to endogenous fluctuations in macroeco-
nomic variables.
Carroll (2003) suggests an alternative route to social interactions, hy-
pothesizing that the diffusion of news from professional forecasters to the rest
of the public leads to ‘stickyness’ in aggregate expectations. The diffusion
of expectations is also a defining characteristic in several recent contribu-
tions that place greater emphasis on social interactions than on individual
concepts of rationality in their study of (survey) expectations. These prob-
abilistic approaches by and large aim for positive models of expectations
formation, but yield mixed results so far. Bowden and McDonald (2008)
study the diffusion of information in various network structures and find a
trade-off between volatility in aggregate expectations and the speed at which
agents learn the correct state of the world. Secondly, they argue that cer-
tain network structures can lead to information cascades. This would be
consistent with the empirical results of Flieth and Foster (2002), who find
that survey expectations are characterized with protracted periods of inertia
punctuated by occasional switches from aggregate optimism to pessimism
or vice versa. They also calibrate a model of ‘interactive expectations’ with
multiple probabilistic equilibria from the data, which indicates that social in-
teractions would have become less important over time. Lux (2009) confirms
the empirical quality of survey expectations, with their pronounced swings
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in aggregate opinions, but he claims evidence in favor of strong interaction
effects. Since both consider German survey expectations and utilize simi-
lar probabilistic formalizations of the expectations process, the question why
they find conflicting results on the importance of interaction effects warrants
some attention.
The source of the different findings might, at least in part, be due to
the details of the probabilistic processes that the authors employ to model
expectations formation. Both approaches formalize changes in expectations
through transition probabilities that additively combine an autonomous and
an interactive element. Flieth and Foster (2002) use a three-state model that
can only be solved numerically, while Lux (2009) uses a two-state model that
exploits well-known results in Markov chain theory and allows for closed-form
solutions not only of the limiting distribution but, in principle, of the entire
time evolution of the expectations process. Yet irrespective of a model’s
probabilistic details, we want to argue here that these differences are likely to
originate from size limitations of existing surveys, because even if we knew the
details of the interaction mechanism, including the exact parameterization
of the expectations process and the network structure among agents, we
would still not be capable of distinguishing between interaction effects and
essentially random correlations in survey responses, nor would we be able to
distinguish model-consistent beliefs from social interactions.
We place a premium on analytical tractability and thus conduct our in-
vestigation in the probabilistic tradition employed by Lux (2009). A number
of results are known in this parsimonious modeling tradition, including (sta-
tistical) equilibrium properties for a wide range of model parameters and the
time evolution of the probability density of beliefs. Understanding how the
qualitative nature of the model changes with the parameters permits us to
isolate the behavioral details of the expectations process from the question
whether it is feasible to detect interaction and network effects from existing
survey data.
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2 Stochastic Model of Expectation Dynamics
The model utilized by Lux (2009) traces back to earlier contributions by
Weidlich and Haag (1983) and Weidlich (2006), and is very similar, both
formally and qualitatively, to the herding model of Kirman (1991, 1993). A
prototypical setup in this tradition considers a population of agents of size
N that is divided into two groups, say, X and Y of sizes n and N − n,
respectively. In the context of survey expectations, the two groups would
correspond to agents who have optimistic or pessimistic beliefs regarding the
future state of an economic or financial indicator.
The basic idea is that agents change state (i) because they follow an
exogenous signal, corresponding for instance to model-consistent beliefs, or
(ii) because of the social interaction with their neighbors, i.e. agents they are
communicating with during a given time period. The transition rate for an
agent i to switch from state X to state Y is
ρi(X → Y ) = ai + λi
∑
j 6=i
DY (i, j), (1)
where ai governs the possibility of self-conversion caused by model-consistent
beliefs, and the sum captures the influence of the neighbors. The parameter
λi governs the interaction strength between i and its neighbors, indexed by
j, while DY (i, j) is an indicator function serving to count the number of i’s
neighbors that are in state Y ,
DY (i, j) =
{
1 if j is a Y-neighbor of i,
0 otherwise.
Analogously the transition rates in the opposite direction, from a pessimistic
to an optimistic state, are given by
ρi(Y → X) = ai + λi
∑
j 6=i
DX(i, j) . (2)
Defining nY (i,J) =
∑
j 6=iDY (i, j) and nX(i,J) =
∑
j 6=iDX(i, j), where J
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denotes particular configurations of the neighbors, and using shorthands
pi−i = ρi(X → Y ) and pi+i = ρi(Y → X), equations (1) and (2) can be
written more compactly as
pi−i = ai + λinY (i,J), (3)
pi+i = ai + λinX(i,J). (4)
As a consequence of the interactions between neighboring agents, the
rates pi±i still depend on the particular configurations of neighbors J, making
it difficult to handle (3) and (4) analytically, but we can employ a mean-field
approximation in order to simplify the problem from a many-agent system
to one with a sum of agents who are independently acting in an “external
field” (see, e.g., Chap. 5 in Aoki, 1998) created by the opinions of other
agents. In other words, we assume that individual agents are influenced by
the average opinion of their neighbors, and that their behavioral parameters
can be aggregated by averaging over all agents.
On the individual level, the instantaneous probability for agent i to switch
from X to Y is given by (3). When the attitudes of i’s neighbors fluctuate,
pi−i fluctuates around its mean〈
pi−i
〉
= ai + λi 〈nY (i)〉 , (5)
where the dependence on J gets lost if we assume that inhomogeneities among
the different configurations of neighbors are solely due to the fluctuations.
Then we can replace the number of Y -neighbors around each agent i with the
average number of neighbors that agents are linked to, say, D and 〈nY (i)〉 =
DPY , with PY being the probability that an i-neighbor is in state Y , which
we can approximate with the unconditional fraction (N − n)/N of agents in
state Y , yielding 〈
pi−i
〉
= ai + λiD
N − n
N
, (6)
and the quantity
〈
pi−i
〉
becomes independent of the particular configuration
of neighbors. Symmetrically, the expression for agents currently in state Y
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becomes 〈
pi+i
〉
= ai + λiD
n
N
. (7)
Basically, the mean-field approximation reduces a complex system of het-
erogeneous interacting agents to a collection of independent agents who are
acting “in the field” that is created by other agents’ beliefs and their average
behavior.
On the aggregate level, we are interested in the probability of observing
a single switch on the system-wide level during some time interval ∆t, hence
we have to sum (7) over all agents in state Y in order to find the aggregate
probability that an agent is switching from state Y to state X during ∆t,
assuming that ∆t is small enough to constrain the switch to a single agent.
Summing (7), which is permissible since the agents are now independent, we
obtain
pi+ = (N − n)
(
a+
λD
N
n
)
, (8)
for a switch from Y to X, and
pi− = n
(
a+
λD
N
(N − n)
)
, (9)
for the reverse switch, where a, b are the mean values of ai, bi averaged over
all agents. It turns out that replacement of behavioral parameters by their
ensemble averages is only sensible if the network structure observes some
regularity conditions and if the fraction of agents with strictly positive bi is
very large, i.e. as long as the fraction of isolated nodes in the agent network
is very small (see Alfarano and Milakovic´, 2009, for details). We will return
to the implications of this point in the final scenario of Section 3.
For notational convenience, we set
b ≡ λD/N, (10)
while setting c ≡ λD would recover the original formulation of Kirman’s
ant model.1 The equilibrium concept associated with the generic transition
1It is well-known that the original formulation of the ant model suffers from the problem
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rates (8) and (9) is a statistical equilibrium outcome: at any time, the state of
the system refers to the concentration of agents in one of the two states. We
define the state of the system through the concentration z = n/N of agents
that are in state X. For large N , the concentration can be treated as a
continuous variable. Notice that none of the possible states of z ∈ [0, 1] is an
equilibrium in itself, nor are there multiple equilibria in the usual economic
meaning of the term.
The notion of equilibrium instead refers to a statistical distribution that
describes the proportion of time the system spends in each state. Utilizing
the Fokker-Planck equation, we can show that for large N the equilibrium
distribution of z is a beta distribution (see Alfarano et al., 2008, for details)
pe(z) =
1
B(, )
z−1(1− z)−1, (11)
where B(, ) = Γ()2/Γ(2) is Euler’s beta function, while the shape param-
eter of the distribution is given by
 = a/b = aN/λD. (12)
Since  is a ratio of quantities that depend (i) on the time scale at which
the process operates (1/a and 1/λ), and (ii) on the spatial characteristics
of the underlying network (D and N), the parameter of the equilibrium
distribution is a well-defined dimensionless quantity. If  < 1 the distribution
is bimodal, with probability mass having maxima at z = 0 and z = 1.
Conversely, if  > 1 the distribution is unimodal, and in the “knife-edge”
scenario  = 1 the distribution becomes uniform. The mean value of z,
E[z] = 1/2, is independent of , and intuitively follows from the difference of
the transition rates (8) and (9), a(N − 2n), showing that in equilibrium the
system approaches n = N/2.
Notice, nevertheless, that the system exhibits very different characteris-
tics depending on the modality of the distribution. In the bimodal case, the
of N -dependence (or ‘self-averaging’ in the jargon of Aoki), i.e. the fact that the system
converges to a unimodal equilibrium when the number of agents is enlarged while keeping
the number of neighbors constant.
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system spends least of the time around the mean, mostly exhibiting very
pronounced herding in either of the extreme states, while mild fluctuations
around the mean characterize the unimodal case. The bimodal case is ap-
parently in line with the empirical finding of protracted periods of inertia
with sudden switches in aggregate opinion. Since in that case  < 1 implies
b > a, the model would seem to suggest that social interactions on average
carry greater weight than idiosyncratic factors in the expectations formation
of agents. The model can also be extended to account for asymmetries in
the average aggregate state with the following transition rates
pi+ = (N − n)(a1 + bn) and pi− = n(a2 + b(N − n)), (13)
where the constants a1 and a2 now allow agents to have a ‘bias’ towards
either state, for instance if a1 > a2 they will exhibit more optimistic than
pessimistic beliefs on average. In this case (see Alfarano et al., 2005, for
details), the corresponding equilibrium distribution is the beta distribution
qe(z) =
1
B(1, 2)
z1−1 (1− z)2−1 , (14)
where B(1, 2) = Γ(1)Γ(2)/Γ(1 + 2) is again the beta function, while the
shape parameters are now given by
1 = a1/b and 2 = a2/b. (15)
Figure 1 illustrates the flexibility in the shape of the beta distribution, with
unimodal and bimodal cases similar to the symmetric case (11) in the top
panel (a,b), but also including monotonically increasing or decreasing cases
in situations where agents have a strong idiosyncratic signal in one direction,
yet still exhibit a relatively pronounced herding tendency relative to the other
state, i.e. a1/b < 1 < a2/b or vice versa, as shown in the bottom panel (c,d).
In summary, the model provides quite a generic description of a stochastic
expectations formation process that contains only a few behavioral parame-
ters a1, a2, and b, yet allows for a large degree of agent heterogeneity. Despite
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Figure 1: Beta distribution for various parameter combinations.
its parsimony, the model produces a wide range of qualitatively different
statistical equilibria, including endogenous cycles in expectations caused by
herding or imitation, but also equilibria where the vast majority of agents
‘learns a correct state’ in spite of being surrounded by noise that is created
through the social interaction with neighboring agents. The qualitative fea-
tures of the process are also parsimoniously summarized by the ratios (12) or
(15), putting us in a position to isolate behavioral aspects from the question
whether it is feasible to identify the communication or network structure
among agents from survey data.
In the next section we argue that an ‘omniscient modeler’, endowed with
perfect knowledge of the behavioral parameters and network structure among
agents, would not be able to reliably recover this network structure based
merely on the correlations in survey responses. Perhaps more troubling, if
our knowledge is confined to the time evolution of survey responses, we will
not even be able to reliably detect whether survey correlations originate from
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social interactions or model-consistent beliefs.
3 Random Benchmark and Simulation
We start with a thought experiment, putting ourselves in the position of an
omniscient modeler (OM) who chooses a particular behavioral setup and net-
work structure for the model in Section 2. Utilizing the individual transition
rates (1) and (2), the OM simulates and records the time evolution of beliefs
for all N agents in the system. Afterwards, the OM presents us with data on
the individual histories of agents’ beliefs (or output for short), from which we
have to determine the network structure among agents based on correlations
in the time evolution of their beliefs.
In actual data on survey expectations, with typically two to three hundred
agents reporting monthly beliefs over roughly two hundred periods, we have
no intrinsic knowledge of the network structure whatsoever. So to make life
easier for us, the OM even informs us of the exact number Di of neighbors
for each agent i = 1, . . . , N . We then compute the Di highest correlations
for each agent from the output and report it back to the OM as our best
guess of the network structure in the output. In return, the OM checks our
guesses against the actual identity of neighbors and reveals the fraction of
correctly identified neighbors to us. The central question is: how many of the
Di neighbors do we expect to guess correctly by pure chance, i.e. irrespective
of the correlation among responses? This establishes a random benchmark
against which we have to judge the success of correlation-based procedures.2
In order to explain the random benchmark, it is instructive to consider a
simple urn model. Let us draw d (read: Di) colored balls without replacement
from an urn containing a total of N balls, m of which are white (read: the
true neighbors of agent i). The probability of drawing k ≤ m white balls in
2Instead of considering the time t correlation, we have conducted the subsequent analy-
sis with various sums of leads and lags in the autocorrelations of responses, yet the results
remain virtually unchanged.
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d draws from a total of N balls is given by the hypergeometric distribution
P [k] =
(
m
k
)(
N−m
d−k
)(
N
d
) , (16)
where the notation on the right hand side refers to binomial coefficients. In
other words, (16) characterizes the distribution of the number of white balls
drawn from the urn in d extractions. The mean value of the hypergeometric
distribution is
E[k] =
dm
N
, (17)
from which we can compute the random benchmark since d = m in our OM
setup.3 The standard deviation of the hypergeometric distribution is
σ[k] =
√
dm(N −m)(N − d)
(N − 1)N2 . (18)
To keep our simulations in line with available survey data (for instance
from the ZEW for German ‘financial experts’, or from the FRB Philadelphia
for US ‘professional forecasters’), we set the number of agents to N = 250;
the available length of periods for individual agent IDs is on average between
one and two hundred, while the number of questions per survey is typically
between thirty and sixty. It will be a sobering experience to recall these
figures when we present the simulation results.
3.1 Simulation setup
Regarding the network structure in our simulations, we consider three proto-
typical setups: random graphs in the Erdo¨s-Renyi tradition, scale-free net-
works in the Barabasi-Albert tradition, and regular lattice structures.4 To
keep matters simple, we set the number of neighbors equal to twenty in the
3Notice that choosing a different number of extractions does not change any of the
qualitative features in the following results, yet the approach immediately translates into
quantitative prescriptions for measuring different benchmarks.
4The review article by Newman (2003) provides the historical background and a com-
prehensive summary of the many mathematical details of these graphs.
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lattice, and tune the parameters of the scale-free and random networks such
that we obtain adjacency matrices with an average number of twenty neigh-
bors as well.5 Given these numbers and (17) and (18), it is straightforward
to compute that the fraction of correct answers we would expect purely by
chance corresponds to E[k] = 1.6 with σ[k] = 1.16, or normalized with re-
spect to the number of extractions E[k]/d = 0.08 and σ[k]/d = 0.058.
In the subsequent figures, we use the mean plus one standard deviation,
E[k] + σ[k] = 2.76, to illustrate the statistical significance of the OM experi-
ment. We can compute the probability of such an event from the cumulative
hypergeometric distribution: since the hypergeometric distribution is defined
for positive integer values of k, we have to consider P (k ≤ 2) = 0.79 and
P (k ≤ 3) = 0.94. Hence the range 0 < E[k] + σ[k] < 3 delivers a rather con-
servative confidence interval in accord with the usual econometric standards.
In line with (1), (2) and (13), the OM implements the transition proba-
bilities φi for each agent i as
φ
(±)
i = ρ
(±)
i ∆t = [a(1,2) + bD
(∓)
i ] ∆t with ∆t = 1/(amax + bN), (19)
where the notation D
(∓)
i refers to the number of i-neighbors that are in the
opposite state, and amax = max{a1, a2}. The choice of ∆t ensures both that
0 < φi ≤ 1 and that all agents act on the same time scale.
The OM then confronts us with the output of the N time series of agents’
beliefs, from which we compute N(N−1)/2 correlation coefficients. For every
i, the OM also informs us of the actual number Di of neighbors, and in turn
we extract the Di highest correlation coefficients from the output. Intuitively
assuming that the highest correlation coefficients correspond to the neighbors
of agent i, we construct the adjacency matrix of the agent network and report
it to the OM who compares it with the actual adjacency matrix, and informs
us of the fraction of correctly identified neighbors for each i. To aggregate
and visualize the results for each of the following three scenarios, we average
5It turns out that changing the number of neighbors in the OM setup has virtually
no influence on the subsequent results. We chose twenty neighbors because this figure
does not appear to be entirely unrealistic. If anything, the communication with twenty
neighbors already takes considerable time and effort in most professions.
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Figure 2: Average fraction of correctly identified neighbors vs length of in-
dividual agents’ time series for a single question. We chose a bimodal simu-
lation setup with parameters ε1 = ε2 = .5 and b = 1, i.e. a strong behavioral
component relative to symmetric exogenous signals in either direction.
the correctly identified percentages for each agent over the entire pool of
agents.
The following scenarios basically consider in how far we can recover the
correct network structure (i) depending on the length of agent histories and
(ii) depending on the number of simultaneous survey answers per agent, i.e.
the volume of survey coverage. The final scenario (iii) takes up a more funda-
mental issue and examines what happens when correlation clusters are caused
by model-consistent beliefs instead of social interactions. Put differently, is
a correlation-based approach capable of distinguishing between clusters that
are caused by either behavioral extreme?
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Figure 3: Average fraction of correctly identified neighbors vs length of in-
dividual agents’ time series for a single question. Here we chose a unimodal
simulation setup with parameters ε1 = ε2 = 2 and b = 1, i.e. a relatively
strong exogenous signal compared to the behavioral component.
3.2 Scenario I: Single indicator histories
Suppose when agents answer questions regarding rather distant areas of ex-
pertise (e.g. international equity indices vs bonds vs GDP growth vs inflation
etc.), they utilize different networks to form their expectations. So if we use
histories for a single indicator in the OM experiment, what is the required
number of observations per agent (or sample size for short) that is necessary
to discriminate between some genuine network structure and random noise?
We consider both a bi- and a unimodal setup to control for behavioral
biases, and display summary results under different network structures in
Figures 2 and 3. The figures illustrate that there is little difference between
random and scale-free setups, while it is easier to identify neighbors when
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they are all arranged in a regular lattice. Regular networks, however, are
the least suitable representation of observed social networks, which tend to
interpolate between random and scale-free structures (see, e.g., Newman,
2003, and the references therein). This is also the reason why we focus our
attention on random graphs in the coming scenarios.
As one would intuitively suspect, the identification of interaction effects
is somewhat facilitated in the bimodal case, i.e. when herding or imitation
dominate the expectations formation process. According to Figures 2 and 3,
however, this aspect has merely second-order effects. Up to a sample size of
around one thousand periods, we are not able to distinguish between noise
and network effects if our knowledge is restricted to the time evolution of
univariate histories. Hence this also implies that we do not have a sufficient
number of empirical survey data at our disposal to reliably identify the social
interaction component. Viewed from this perspective, any cluster we identify
based on the cross-correlations of answers is essentially pure noise. If we
consider the confidence interval in Figures 2 and 3, the first scenario suggests
that it is entirely unrealistic to identify even a rudimentary communication
structure unless we increase the frequency of survey responses by one order
of magnitude, i.e. from monthly to roughly twice per week. In addition, if we
are indeed facing irregular network structures, the length of single indicator
histories that is necessary to correctly identify about half the neighbors turns
out to be two orders of magnitude larger than empirical sample sizes.6
3.3 Scenario II: Multiple indicator histories
Can we improve the identification of communication structures if we make
the strong assumption that behavioral parameters in the expectations for-
mation process of agents do not change across multiple questions, and that
their network structure remains unchanged as well? And how many questions
would be necessary in that case? To tackle this issue, we keep the parame-
terizations of the previous scenario and simulate the expectations formation
process on a random network, fixing the length of single question histories
6Simulation results upon request.
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Figure 4: Increasing the number of questions and averaging over them im-
proves the identification of interaction effects compared to the previous uni-
variate scenario. The model parameterizations remain the same as before,
and we utilize a random network whose structure remains fixed as well. The
underlying univariate responses have a length of two hundred periods.
to two hundred while successively increasing the number of questions. Es-
sentially, this means that the correlation coefficients are averaged both over
agents and over questions. To operationalize this procedure, we fix the pa-
rameterization and underlying network structure of social interactions and
run K independent simulations of the model for two hundred periods. For
each single run of length two hundred, we perform the estimation procedure
outlined in the previous scenario, and then average over the K questions.
The results both for uni- and bimodal setups, along with the random
benchmark, are displayed in Figure 4 and show that a multivariate correlation-
based procedure performs better than in the previous univariate scenario. As
expected, a bimodal environment with strong interactions again somewhat
facilitates the identification of the network structure, but the more appealing
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feature of this scenario is that the rate at which we discover actual links is
markedly higher than in the univariate case. On the downside, however, the
overall accuracy of the correlation-based procedure remains low. Keeping in
mind that the empirical volume of survey coverage includes roughly thirty to
sixty questions, correlation-based estimates of the interaction structure are
almost not significantly different from pure noise, and certainly very low to
begin with: we recover merely twenty percent of the actual network struc-
ture, and the fraction of correctly identified neighbors increases very slowly
with the number of questions.
3.4 Scenario III: Exogenously switching signal
In both of the preceding scenarios we have assumed that all agents have a
strictly positive interaction parameter, which we conveniently set to b = 1.
But what happens if some agents are not socially interacting at all (b = 0) and
instead form model-consistent beliefs from exogenous signals a1, a2 that we
can think of as transmitting the correct state of the world? In principle, these
‘rational’ agents should exhibit highly correlated responses over time if the
exogenous signal is sufficiently strong relative to the interaction parameter.
If the state of the world does not change over time, the rational agents will
all converge to the correct state, making it almost trivial to identify them
from correlation-based procedures. In order to maintain an empirically more
relevant scenario, we thus assume that the correct state of the world changes
every now and then, i.e. the parameters a1, a2 are no longer constant but
change over time.7
In this scenario, we keep the total number of agents at N = 250 in our
simulations, and the underlying network remains a random graph with an
average degree of twenty neighbors. The values of a˜1 = a˜2 = b˜ = 1 are
constant over time for the majority N˜ = 200 of agents, while a smaller group
of fifty ‘rational’ agents exhibits time-varying idiosyncratic coefficients, say
a1(t) and a2(t), which essentially measure the speed at which rational agents
7From a mathematical point of view, this would correspond to a so-called switching
diffusion process.
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Figure 5: Fraction of correctly identified rational agents who follow a time-
varying exogenous signal that is increasingly biased in either direction (de-
noted by an increasing value of amax) vs their interaction strength b. At low
values of b, the identification generally performs very well, while higher val-
ues of b might prevent a reliable detection, depending on the relative value
of amax.
learn the true state of the world. The time-varying coefficients take on values
in the set {1, amax}, where amax = max{a1(t), a2(t)}. Suppose for instance
that amax = 10 and that the currently ‘true’ state is such that a1(0) = 1 and
a2(0) = 10, i.e. we are in an optimistic regime today. When the true state
changes to pessimism, say in period τ , the parameters change to a1(τ) = 10
and a2(τ) = 1. As far as the switching probability in our simulations is
concerned, we assume that the probability to switch is five percent, drawn
randomly from a uniform distribution. In other words, an exogenous switch
in the signal occurs on average every twenty months in our simulations.
The matter in question now concerns the fraction of rational agents that
we can correctly identify if the true state of the world changes over time, as it
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certainly does in reality. (Notice that we have to adapt the error band since
now d = m = 50.) None the less, we would expect the value of b to also have
an influence on our ability to identify the rational agents: when b increases,
the noise generated through the social interactions with the other agents
should make it more difficult to identify rational agents correctly. On the
other hand, when rational agents are not part of the social network (b = 0),
and thus do not take possibly non-rational opinons into account, it should
become easier to correctly identify them with correlation-based procedures.
Figure 5 plots the fraction of correctly identified rational agents for a
given amax when the interaction parameter b takes on values in [0, 1]. The
different plots in Figure 5 refer to increasing values of amax in the simulations.
As expected, our ability to correctly identify the group of rational agents
depends inversely on their interaction parameter b, possibly approaching the
noise level as b approaches the value common to the other N˜ agents. On the
other hand, when b approaches zero, we are in an increasingly comfortable
position regarding the identification of rational agents. Finally, the faster the
signal processing ability amax, the easier it becomes to correctly identify the
group of rational agents, asymptotically reaching the value of one hundred
percent independently of b.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
All computations in the preceding scenarios have been performed under the
assumption that the OM informs us of the actual number Di of neighbors
for each agent. Clearly, this is a most unrealistic assumption in the context
of empirical applications to survey data, where we simply have no way of
knowing whether agents interact socially in the first place, much less to whom
they are linked to in case they do. Viewed from this perspective, our results
are if anything overly optimistic to begin with.
Yet the third scenario delivers maybe the most fatal blow to any hopes
that survey data could settle the question whether interaction effects are
present in the expectations formation process of respondents or not. Our
preferred way to read Figure 5 is that we can achieve any desired accuracy in
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the identification of network structure through an appropriate combination
of b and a time-varying exogenous signal amax. The other side of that coin
is that we have no way of distinguishing between interaction effects and
model-consistent beliefs, even if we identify relatively strong patterns in the
correlations of a subset of agents.
Ultimately, these results suggest that existing survey data cannot facil-
itate our understanding of the process of expectations formation, which is
particularly troubling in light of its central importance for modern macroe-
conomic theory. To end on a more constructive note, we would like to point
out once more that our thought experiment presumed that we merely have
data on the time evolution of agents’ beliefs. In order to investigate whether
interaction effects are indeed present in the data, it would be enormously
helpful if surveys contained questions that refer directly to the presence of
interaction effects.
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